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-IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
ALAN DAVIS, EXECUTOR, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Defendant 
CASE NO. 312322 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
1) MOTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEAPING& 
2) HEARING REQUESTED 
Defendant, State of Ohio, by and through counsel, Stephanie 
Tubbs Jones, Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County, and 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Marilyn Barkley Cassidy and 
Patrick Murphy, hereby moves this Honorable Court for judgment on 
the pleadings pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C). The grounds for 
this motion are that the State of Ohio is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law as is set forth more fully in the brief attached 
hereto and expressly incorporated herein by reference. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
L Y CASSIDY (0 14647) 
~.n ........... HY ( 0002401) 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Floor 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO 
---
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
Alan J. Davis, Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel 
Sheppard, through counsel, has requested the Cuyahoga County Court 
of Common Pleas, by way of petition, to make a determination that 
he is a wrongfully incarcerated individual pursuant to Ohio Revised 
Code Sections 2305.02 and 2743.48. The State of Ohio asserts that, 
pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) the court should enter judgment 
as a matter of law on behalf of the state. This court has no 
jurisdiction to hear the within case inasmuch as the plaintiff, 
Alan Davis fails to meet the explicit jurisdictional requirements 
of R.C. §2305.02 and §2743.48. 
Moreover, the State of Ohio is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law by operation of the doctrine of laches, the 
applicable statutes of limitation. Additionally, a claim of 
wrongful incarceration is a personal claim which an estate has no 
standing to pursue. Finally, any claim which may have been lawfully 
asserted by Samuel Sheppard has abated with his death, the passage 
of time, and his failure to pursue the claim at or near the time of 
his acquittal. 
FACTS 
Dr. Samuel Sheppard was indicted for murder in the first 
degree on August 17, 1954, in connection with the death of his 
wife, Marilyn Sheppard. (Complaint Paragraph 1). His trial ended 
2 
-.. with a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree on December 
-
-
21, 1954, and on January 3, 1955 he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. (Complaint, paragraph 2). After a lengthy appeals 
process, the United States Supreme Court in 1964, reversed the 
conviction and ordered a new trial based on the unfairness of the 
trial and the prejudicial role of the media. (Complaint, paragraph 
3). on November 16, 1966, Dr. Sheppard was subject to a re-trial 
and found not guilty of the murder. (Complaint paragraph 4). Dr. 
Sheppard was incarcerated for nearly ten years in Ohio prisons. 
(Complaint, paragraph 5). 
Dr. Sheppard died on April 6, 1970. (Complaint, paragraph 6). 
The action at bar was filed by the Special Administrator to the 
Estate of Samuel Sheppard in October, 1995, nearly thirty years 
after Dr. Sheppard's acquittal. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS BOTH PROPER AND PERMISSIBLE 
Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) provides: 
"After the pleadings are closed but within 
such time as not to delay trial, any party may 
move for judgment on the pleadings." 
It is well established in Ohio that after reviewing pleadings, 
if a court finds that there exist no material issues of fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the 
moving party's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be 
granted. Mc Comb v. Suburban Natural Gas Co. (1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 
3 
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397. Determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
restricted solely to allegations in the pleadings, and all material 
allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom are to be construed in favor of the non-moving 
party. Flanagan v. Williams, (1993) 87 Ohio App. 3d 768. Moreover, 
consideration of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is squarely 
within the discretion of the court. "Whether the motion constitutes 
a delay of trial is within the discretion of the court; however, if 
it seems clear that the motion may effectively dispose of the case, 
the court should permit it regardless of any delay its 
consideration may cause." Fischer v. Morales, 38 Ohio App. 3d 110 
(1987). 
Judgment on the pleadings is the appropriate, expeditious 
outcome for the case at bar. The operative facts as stated are 
undisputed. As will be shown below in greater depth, this court is 
completely devoid of jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Alternatively, the State of Ohio is materially prejudiced by having 
to defend a claim some thirty years after it accrued. 
Additionally, the legislative history relevant to R.C. §2743.48 
together with its specific language demonstrate that the intent of 
the legislature was and continues to be compensation of 
individuals, not their representatives, heirs and assigns. 
Finally, the Sheppard estate advances a so-called "new" theory 
of the crime as a part of its petition. Even assuming those 
conclusory theories to be true for the purpose of ruling upon this 
motion under civil Rule 12 (C), those facts have no relevance to 
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the issue at bar in light of the jurisdictional defect, statutes of 
limitation and the doctrines of laches and standing which have been 
raised by the State of Ohio. 
B. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR OR ENTER JUDGMENT IN 
THE ACTION PENDING 
An action for wrongful incarceration is purely statutory. 
Accordingly, all requisites set forth in R.C. §2305.02 and R.C. 
§2743.48 must be met. The language in R.C. §2305.02 is explicitly 
jurisdictional: 
2305. 02 Jurisdiction to bear action for wrongful imprisomaent. 
"A Court of Common Pleas has exclusive, original jurisdiction 
to hear and determine an action or proceeding that is 
commenced by an individual who satisfies divisions CA) (1) to 
(4) of Section 2743.48 of the Revised Code and that seeks a 
determination by the court that the offense of which he was 
found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either 
was not committed by him or was not committed by any person .. 
(Emphasis Added) 
R.C. §2743.48 sets forth detailed requirements defining who is 
a "wrongfully imprisoned individual": 
2743.48 Civil Action against state for wrongful imprisonment 
(A) As used in this section, a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual" means an individual who satisfies each of the 
following: 
(1) He was charged with a violation of a section of 
the Revised Code by an indictment or information 
prior to, or on or after, September 24, 1986, and 
the violation charged was an aggravated felony or 
felony. 
(2) He was found guilty of, but did not plead 
guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-
included offense by the court or jury 
involved, and the offense of which he was 
found guilty was an aggravated felony or 
5 
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-
felony. 
( 3) He was sentenced to an indefinite or 
definite term of imprisonment in a state penal 
or reformatory institution for the offense of 
which he was found guilty. 
(4) The individual's conviction was vacated or 
was dismissed, or reversed on appeal, • . . 
(5) Subsequent to his sentencing and during or 
subsequent to his imprisonment, it was 
determined by a court of common pleas that the 
offense of which he was found guilty , 
including all lesser included offenses, either 
was not committed by him or was not committed 
by any person . . . 
The plaintiff in this action fails to meet the explicit 
jurisdictional requirements of the statutes. Alan Davis, the 
executor of the Sheppard estate, is arguably an individual. 
However, he is not an individual who satisfies divisions (A) (1) 
through (4) of R.C. §2743.48. Specifically, Alan Davis was not 
charged with a felony. Alan Davis was not found guilty of the 
felony at issue. Alan Davis was not sentenced to imprisonment, nor 
did he serve time for the offense at issue. The conviction appealed 
was not that of Alan Davis. The statutory scheme was designed to 
preclude exactly the type of case at bar. Inasmuch as the plaintiff 
herein patently fails to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 
the statute, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the 
parties and must dismiss the case. 
C. THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
This action illustrates precisely the reason that legislatures 
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enact statutes which render lawsuits time barred. It is said that 
sound public policy justifies a limitation for commencement of 
actions because of the difficulty of preserving evidence, the 
frailty of the memory, and the contingency of the death of 
witnesses. Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose. They are 
designed to secure the peace of society and are enacted to prevent 
delay in asserting claims. The object and purpose of the statutes 
of limitation are to encourage diligence in the enforcement of 
demands and the speedy adjudication of the rights of parties. See 
generally, 66 O Jur 3d Section 2, p. 129. 
"Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of 
society and are favored in the law. They promote repose 
by giving security and stability to human affairs. An 
important public policy lies at their foundation. They 
stimulate to activity and punish negligence. While time 
is constantly destroying the evidence of rights they 
supply its place by a presumption which renders proof 
unnecessary. Mere delay extending to the limit prescribed 
is itself a conclusive bar. The bane and the antidote go 
together. "Wood v. carpenter, 101 us 135, 25 Led 807, 
quoted in Lamkin v. Robinson, 10 ONP NS 1, 21 O Dec 13. 
The bulk of the Wrongful Imprisonment statute appears in 
Chapter 2743. However, R.C. Section 2305.02 provides that the court 
of common Pleas has original jurisdiction over the first stage of 
the bifurcated proceeding. The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that 
wrongful imprisonment actions are civil actions. See State of Ohio 
v. Neil s. Jackson, 1994 Ohio App. Lexis 1737 (April 20, 1994). See 
also, State of Ohio v. Lary Smith, 1989 Ohio App. Lexis 2019 (9th 
Appellate District). Accordingly, the general statutes of 
limitation contained in R.C. Chapter 2305 apply to such actions. 
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R.C. 2305.07 
" Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of 
the Revised Code, an action upon a contract not in 
writing, express or implied, or upon a liability created 
by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, shall be 
brought within six years after the cause thereof 
accrued." (Emphasis added) 
R.C. §2743.48 is a remedial, not a penal statute, as at least 
one court has noted. Wright v. State, 69 Ohio App. 3d 775, 591 
N.E.2d 1279 (1990). 
"For purposes of statutory construction, 'penal statute' 
is one which imposes penalty or creates forfeiture, while 
'remedial statute' is enacted to correct past defects, to 
redress existing wrong, or to promote public good ••. In 
this regard 2743. 48 is a remedial statute in that it 
addresses an existing wrong. The General Assembly 
determined that it was patently wrong to deny a person 
compensation when the judicial system failed to 
adequately safeguard his rights, under the circumstances 
set forth in the statute .•. It does not appear the 
legislature intended the remedy to penal. .. " 
Wright v. State, supra, at 779. 
The proceeding at bar is a statutory one. Petitioner seeks to 
recover damages upon a liability created by statute. Absent the 
statute, no liability would exist on the part of the State of Ohio 
by virtue of sovereign immunity. As a matter of public policy, the 
legislature could not have intended that there exist no time limit 
upon an individual's right to seek recovery for wrongful 
incarceration. As a matter of law, the six year limitation set 
forth in R.C. §2305.07 applies. The action can be said to have 
accrued, most conservatively speaking, no later than the effective 
date of the statute, September 24, 1986. As the petitioner in this 
action did not file until October 19, 1995, the commencement of the 
action falls outside the six year limitation period of §2305.07. 
8 
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R.c. 2305.09 "Pour Years; certain torts 
An action for any of the following causes shall be brought 
within four years after the cause thereof accrued; 
(A) For trespassing upon real property; 
(B) For the recovery of personal property, or for taking or 
detaining it; 
(C) For relief on the ground of fraud; 
(D) :ror an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising 
on contract nor enumerated in sections 2305 .10 to 2305 .12 
2305.14 and 1304.34 of the Revised Code ••• 
R.C. §2305.10 applies to Bodily injury or injury to personal 
property; §2305.11 deals with libel, slander malicious prosecution, 
false imprisonment and malpractice; R.C. §1304. 34 applies to 
commercial transactions. Thus, any rights of the petitioner, 
herein, fall under section (D) of R.C. §2305.09. A liberal 
interpretation of accrual yields the date the. wrongful 
incarceration statute became effective, September 24, 1986. Thus, 
assuming for the purpose of this motion that petitioner in fact has 
a claim, the statute of limitations ran in September of 1990, and 
this claim is time barred. 
D. THIS ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION IS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF LACHES 
In order to successfully prosecute a claim of laches, the 
person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially 
prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his 
rights." Smith v. Smith, 169 Ohio St. 447, 455, 156, N.E. 2d 113, 
119 (1959). The elements of laches are: delay or lapse of time in 
asserting a right, absence of excuse for such delay, knowledge, 
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-.. actual or constructive, of injury or wrong, and prejudice to the 
other party. Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, (1984) 16 Ohio App 3d 
399, 476 N.E. 2d 683. Delay in asserting a right does not of itself 
constitute laches and in order to successfully invoke the equitable 
doctrine of laches, it must be shown that the person for whose 
benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by 
the delay of person asserting his claim. Thirty Four Corp. V. sixty 
Seven Corp, (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d 350, 474 N.E. 2d. 299. Laches is 
an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained 
length of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse 
party; it signifies delay independent of limitations in statutes, 
and it is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence. cunnin v. 
Bailey (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d. 34, 472 N.E.2d. 328 .. 
-
-
It is readily ascertainable from the face of the pleadings in 
the case at bar, that an overwhelmingly prejudicial lapse in time 
has occurred between the acquittal of Samuel Sheppard and the 
filing of this claim. In the intervening thirty years since the 
acquittal and the near forty-two years since the crime occurred, 
events have transpired which preclude the State of Ohio from 
presenting its complete case; not the least of which is the death 
of the individual alleged to have been wrongfully incarcerated. 
(Petition, paragraph 6). Claimant's representatives conducted 
witness interviews between the years 1990 and 1995; nearly thirty 
years after the crime, when memories have undeniably faded. 
Moreover, prior to the enactment of R.C. §2743.48 and R.C. 
§2305.02 recourse for wrongful incarceration existed in the form of 
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moral claims. Since as early as 1923, consideration was given to a 
fault in the justice system which allowed an innocent individual to 
fall through its grips and land in a correctional institution. 
"Wrongful Incarceration In Ohio: Should There be More than A Moral 
Obligation to Compensate? 12 Cap Univ. Law Rev 230. "Inherently 
defective convictions are usually initiated by witnesses/testimony 
and the circumstantial evidence admitted during trial. . •• :the 
1923 court was accurate in its analysis of such occurrences as not 
being attributable to any fault in the law; actually, the 
convictions are due to a mixture of human perceptive errors, not 
legal ones. These errors are consequences of variables such as a 
witness/ or victim's reactions to the crime, the level of 
disturbance in the emotional balance of an individual in response 
to both physical and mental stress. 
Generally, the faulty convictions were not acknowledged until 
the true guilty party was ascertained. Thereupon, the legislature 
may feel a moral obligation to rectify state infliction of injury 
upon an individual. Certain requirements must be met before the 
legislature so acted: 
"First, a cause of action against the state must not 
exist for the individual in a court of law ... Second 
there must be a moral obligation to make amends. A moral 
obligation is one which is not enforceable by action, but 
is binding on the party who has the obligation in 
conscience and according to natural justice. The 
obligation is viewed as a duty which would be.enforceable 
if not for a rule, such as sovereign immunity, which 
exempts the party from legal liability. The extent to 
which moral obligations are to be recognized has been 
deemed to be a determination properly remaining in the 
hands of the legislature. Finally, there must be no 
dispute as to the facts of the particular case. 
11 
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"Wrongful Incarceration in Ohio: Should there Be More Than A 
Moral Obligation to Compensate?" 12 Capital University Law Review 
265 (1982). 
Clearly Samuel Sheppard, himself, could have sought redress at 
or near the time of his acquittal through the moral claims process. 
He failed to do so. Since Sheppard's demise in 1970, only the 
administrator of his estate, whose standing is questionable and 
will be further examined below, is left to initiate the claim. 
The petitioner has set forth no explanation as to why no recourse 
has been sought until now. While events which have transpired over 
the passage of time have materially prejudiced the State of Ohio, 
the face of the pleadings reveal that Samuel Sheppard is 
unavailable to testify at his own trial. Accordingly, the State's 
motion should be granted. 
E. THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD LACKS STANDING TO BRING A 
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION 
The adoption of Ohio Constitution, Art. IV Section 4, in its 
present form in 1968 made justiciability a constitutional 
requirement, expressly adopting the view which had long been taken 
by the Ohio Supreme Court. Fortner v. Thomas (1970) 22 Ohio St. 2d. 
13 (concurring opinion of Duncan, J.). 
"It has been long and well established that it is the 
duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual 
controversies between parties legitimately affected by 
specific facts and to render judgments which can be 
carried into effect. It has become settled judicial 
responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions 
on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by 
judgment of premature declarations or advice upon 
12 
-potential controversies." Fortner v. Thomas, supra, at 
13. 
Even before the enactment of the constitutional requirement of 
justiciability, Ohio Courts had never permitted their jurisdiction 
to be invoked for the determination of abstract declarations or for 
the consideration of anything other than actual controversies 
between the actual parties litigant. For example, in Stewart v. 
Southard. 17 Ohio 402 (1848), the court held: 
"It is our duty to decide such questions only as become 
necessary to ascertain the rights of the parties 
litigant, and are legitimately presented upon the record, 
and we cannot admit that parties have the power to call 
for an opinion on a matter not thus presented, which is 
out of the case ... " Stewart , supra, at 406. 
The question of jus tertii standing has been examined most fully in 
federal courts. As the Supreme Court stated in Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982): 
"The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of constitutional 
requirements and prudential considerations ..• [A]t an 
irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who 
invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally 
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result 
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.' 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 99 
(1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the 
challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a 
favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner 
does Article III limit the federal judicial power 'to 
those disputes which confine federal courts to a role 
consistent with a system of separated powers and which 
are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution 
through the judicial process.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 97 (1968) 11 
Thus, the standing doctrine can be organized into a three-
13 
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factor test: (1) injury in fact; {2) causation; and (3) 
redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 s. ct. 2130, 
3136 {1992). 
In the case at bar, factors one {injury in fact) and three 
(redressability) are not met. The individual who is alleged to have 
been wrongfully incarcerated is deceased. As is discussed above, 
there is no provision under law for an estate to seek recovery in 
a representative capacity. Moreover, as will be discussed in 
greater depth below, the statute at issue, R.C. 2743.48 applies 
only to individuals, NOT their representatives, heirs and assigns. 
Additionally, there is no allegation in the petition as to any 
injury by virtue of wrongful incarceration to anyone except the 
deceased, Samuel Sheppard. Finally, assuming some injury in fact 
did occur to Samuel Sheppard, money damages to the estate cannot 
redress those injuries. It is clear that the Estate of Samuel 
Sheppard has failed to set forth the constitutionally requisite 
case and controversy to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 
F. R.C. §2743.48 CAN BE CONSTRUED ONLY TO AFFORD REDRESS TO 
WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS, NOT THEIR HEIRS. 
REPRESENTATIVES AND ASSIGNS. 
The state has waived its immunity from liability and consented 
to be sued in the Court of Claims by virtue of R.C. §2743.02 (A), 
which provides, as follows: 
"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and 
consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, 
in the court of claims created in this chapter in 
accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits 
between private parties, subject to the limitations set 
14 
-forth in this chapter." 
The state's waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability has not 
opened up the public coffers to all who may seek recompense but, 
rather permits the liability of the state to be determined in 
accordance with the rules of law applicable to suits between 
private parties, no new claim for relief or right of action being 
created by the waiver of immunity. R.C. §2743.02 {A) merely permits 
actions against the state to be brought which were previously 
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but such actions must 
be predicated upon previously recognized claims for relief, for 
which the state would have been liable except for sovereign 
immunity. Smith v. Wait, {1975) 46 Ohio App 2d. 281 at 283. 
The Court of Claims Act did not authorize a new claim allowing 
a civil action against the state for wrongful imprisonment. That 
action became viable only upon the adoption of R.C. §2743.48 by the 
General Assembly. R.C. §2743.48 created duties, rights, and 
obligations of a substantive nature. Smith v. Wait, supra. 
The scope of remediation is clearly limited to the individual by 
the statutory language. 
It is a cardinal rule that the court must first look to 
language of a statute itself to determine legislative intent. 
Courts do not have authority to ignore plain and unambiguous 
language of statute under guise of statutory interpretation, but 
must give effect to words used; in other words, courts may not 
delete words used or insert words not used. In re Collier (Athens 
1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 232. In interpreting a statute words must be 
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taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning. Love v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394. 
In Ohio, the specific inclusion by the legislature of items in 
a statute implies the exclusion of others. Kirsheman v. Paulin 
(1951) 155 Ohio St. 137, 146, Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473. 
See also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio St. 3d 176 
It is significant that the drafters of this legislation chose 
the word 11 individual 11 • An individual, as defined by Websters 
Dictionary is: 
11 1. a single human being, as distinguished from a group. 
2. a person. 3. a distinct, indivisible entity; a single 
thing, being, instance or item. 11 
The use of the word individual, as opposed to the word person, 
which has undergone extensive legal interpretation, expresses a 
clear, unambiguous intent to limit compensation to an individual. 
Further evidence of the legislature's intent to limit 
eligibility for compensation under R.C. §2743.48 can be found in 
subsection (B) (1): 
11 When a court of common pleas determines, . . • that a 
person is a wrongfully imprisoned individual, the court 
shall provide the person with a copy of this section and 
orally inform him and his attorney of his rights under 
this section. . . (Emphasis Added) 
Such language demonstrates a clear contemplation that the litigant 
himself be present. Moreover, as a matter of public policy it is 
logical that a remedy be available to those wrongfully 
incarcerated, but that state coffers NOT be opened to the families 
of deceased individuals who decide to pursue a claim after the 
·- fact. 
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Finally, had the legislature wished to include the 
representatives, heirs and assigns of wrongfully imprisoned 
individuals as compensable under the statute, it would have 
included specific language to so indicate, as it did , for example, 
in R.C. §2125.02 {Wrongful Death Statute). It is not within the 
authority of the court to extend clear and unambiguous language to 
areas that very language was designed to exclude. 
G. AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION ABATED WITH THE DEATH 
OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD 
Section 2311.21 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for 
abatement by death of a party. Specifically, the section states: 
"Unless otherwise provided, no action or proceeding 
pending in any court shall abate by the death of either 
or both of the parties thereto, except actions for libel, 
slander, malicious prosecution, for a nuisance or against 
a judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which 
shall abate by the death of either party." 
Section 2305.21, Ohio Revised Code, determines those causes 
which survive and provides: 
"[i]n addition to the causes of action which survive at 
common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or 
injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or 
fraud, also shall survive; and such actions may be 
brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled 
or liable thereto." 
"In order for an action to survive under R.C. §2305.21, the 
action must be one for injuries to the person and that term means 
physical injuries." Village of Oakwood v. Makar, 11 Ohio App 3d 46, 
47, (1983). At least one court has held" injuries to the person 
does not encompass injuries to character or reputation: Flynn v. 
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Relic. 41404 (8th District. Ohio) (June 26, 1980). 
An action for wrongful imprisonment, thus, is not an action for 
physical injuries and does not survive pursuant to R.c. §2305.21. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the "unless otherwise provided" language 
in R.C. §2311.21, the action is subject to abatement. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law, the 
State of Ohio respectfully requests a full hearing on these issues; 
that the action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Alternatively, defendant respectfully requests that the court enter 
judgment on its behalf. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
ILYN LEY CASSID80014647) 
PATRICK MURPHY (0002401) 
Assistant Prosecuting At orneys 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO 
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CEBTIFICATE OF SEBVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Motion has been sent by regular U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, on this ~ day of May, 1997, to Terry 
Gilbert, 1700 Standard Building, 1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, OH 
44113. 
YN LEY CASSIDY Assistant~osecuting At~orney 
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